Maurice Gamelin

Gamelin's father, Zéphyrin, fought in the Battle of Solferino in 1859.

From an early age Gamelin showed potential as a soldier, growing up in a generation seeking revenge on Germany for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine at the end of the Franco-Prussian War.

Maurice Gustave Gamelin (20 September 1872 – 18 April 1958 ) was an army general in the French Army.

Maurice Gamelin was born in Paris on 20 September 1872.

Gamelin volunteered for service on 19 October 1891 before entering the military academy at Saint-Cyr on 31 October.

In 1893, he graduated first in his class.

He began in the French tirailleurs with the 3rd Regiment based in Tunisia.

He then joined the topographic brigade.

When Gamelin came back to Paris in 1897, he entered the prestigious École Supérieure de Guerre and finished second of his class of about eighty of the best future officers in the French Army.

Charles Lanrezac, then second-in-command of the École Supérieure de Guerre, and later a general in the early days of World War I, noted Gamelin as an intelligent, cultivated, and industrious young officer, bound to earn higher functions in the future.

Gamelin joined the staff of the 15th Army Corps before commanding a company of the 15th battalion of the Chasseurs Alpins in 1904.

He received the applause of his superiors for his diligence at manœuvre.

He published Philosophical Study on the Art of War in 1906, which critics praised, predicting he would become an important military thinker in the near future.

He then became an attaché to General Joseph Joffre (a future Marshal of France, as he led the French forces during World War I).

In 1911, Gamelin was given command of the 11th battalion of the Chasseurs Alpins in Annecy.

Gamelin served with distinction under Joseph Joffre in World War I. He is often credited with being responsible for devising the outline of the French counter-attack in 1914 which led to victory during the First Battle of the Marne.

However, in March 1914 he joined Joffre's general staff (1914–18 called Grand Quartier Général).

Early in the war, Gamelin helped draft the plans that led to the victory at the Battle of the Marne.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel and fought in Alsace on the Linge and later on the Somme.

He became colonel in April 1916, and with good results on the battlefield was further promoted within eight months to the rank of brigadier general.

He commanded the French 11th Infantry Division from April 1917 until the end of the war.

In the region of Noyon, he showed sophisticated tactical skills by gaining ground without losing lives needlessly (which had been atypical earlier in the war, see Attaque à outrance).

This position had been obtained with the help of Ferdinand Foch (also a future Marshal of France, as he led the Allied Forces to victory on the Western Front in 1918).

These positions provided Gamelin with a solid knowledge of strategic and tactical warfare.

From 1919 to 1924, Gamelin was the head of the French military mission in Brazil.

He then commanded the French Army in the Levant, now Syria and Lebanon.

He was the commander of the 30th Military Region in Nancy from 1919 to 1931, when he was named head of the general staff of the French Army.

In 1932 he knew the Reichswehr mobilization plan was to at least treble their force, but lacked intelligence on the armament plan, the militia plan, or the Manstein Plan.

He prepared France's military until the beginning of World War II, although challenged by restricted funding (→ Great Depression in France) and by the political inertia regarding German re-armament and later the Third Reich, which was intensified after the end of the Allied occupation of the Rhineland and its remilitarisation.

In 1933 Gamelin rose to command the French Army and oversaw a modernisation and mechanisation programme, including the completion of the Maginot Line defences.

Édouard Daladier supported Gamelin throughout his career, owing to Gamelin's refusal to allow politics to play a part in military planning and promotion, and his commitment to the republican model of government; this was not a trivial matter at a time when Communists on the left and Royalists and Fascists on the right were openly advocating regime change in France.

At the outbreak of the war in September 1939, Gamelin was considered one of the best commanding generals in Europe, and was respected even among the Wehrmacht.

When war was declared in 1939, Gamelin was France's commander in chief, with his headquarters at the Château de Vincennes, a facility completely devoid of telephonic or any other electronic links to his commanders in the field: a massive oversight in the face of the Wehrmacht's subsequent swift and flexible ‘Blitzkrieg’ tactics.

France saw little action during the Phoney War, apart from a few French divisions crossing the German border in the Saar Offensive, who advanced a mere 8 km. They stopped even before reaching Germany's unfinished Siegfried Line.

According to General Siegfried Westphal, a German staff officer on the Western Front, if France had attacked in September 1939 German forces could not have held out for more than one or two weeks.

Gamelin is remembered for his disastrous command (until 17 May 1940) of the French military during the Battle of France in World War II and his steadfast defence of republican values.

The Commander-In-Chief of the French Armed Forces at the start of World War II, Gamelin was viewed as a man with significant intellectual ability.

He was respected, even in Germany, for his intelligence and "subtle mind", though he was viewed by some German generals as stiff and predictable.

Despite this, and his competent service in World War I, his command of the French armies during the critical days of May 1940 proved to be disastrous.

Historian and journalist William L. Shirer presented the view that Gamelin used World War I methods to fight World War II, but with less vigor and slower response.